BIGS ESSENZ

Brandenburgisches Institut für **Gesellschaft** und **Sicherheit**

A CONCEPT FOR A CRIMINOLOGICAL REGIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE BORDER REGION BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND

Results from a German-Polish research project

Rafał Batkowski . Kai Beerlink . Paul Glöckner . Bartłomiej Ostrowski . Tim Stuchtey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The SAFE project, titled "Security Alliance for German-Polish Endeavors" was initiated to develop a joint criminological regional analysis at the border region between Germany and Poland. The project, funded by the German-Polish Science Foundation, aims to strengthen cross-border cooperation in crime prevention and enhance security in the region. Through the organization of expert workshops in Potsdam and Poznań, the project successfully brought together key stakeholders, including representatives from local governments, law enforcement, and academic institutions, to discuss the challenges and opportunities in implementing such an analysis.

The outcomes of the SAFE project include the identification of potential pilot regions, a framework for conducting the criminological regional analysis, and recommendations for securing necessary funding. The analysis is designed to address both objective crime data and subjective perceptions of safety among residents, with a particular focus on the unique challenges posed by the border region. By fostering collaboration between German and Polish authorities, the project seeks to build a shared understanding of security threats, enhance trust between communities, and support informed decision-making in local crime prevention efforts.

BIGS ESSENZ NO. 22 . September 2024

Polish Platform For Homeland Security

DEUTSCH POLNISCHE WISSENSCHAFTS STIFTUNG | POLSKO NIEMIECKA FUNDACJA NA RZECZ NAUKI

SAFE Security Alliance for German-Polish Endeavors

BIGS BRANDENBURGISCHES INSTITUT für GESELLSCHAFT und SICHERHEIT

1 INTRODUCTION

The scientific interest in Criminological Regional Analysis, or to be more concrete, criminological regional analysis has been increasing since the mid-1960s. In Germany, there has been increasing research since the 1990s.[1] Findings that show discrepancies between subjective feelings of fear of crime and statistical data on crime indicate that subjective perceptions of security and crime matter. However, methodological issues remain in regard to the comparability of subjective feelings and reported statistics on crime.[2] These issues will be highlighted briefly in the upcoming section.

In 2023, the Brandenburg Insitute for Society and Security (BIGS) in Potsdam, together with its partner from the Polish Platform for Homeland Security (PPHS), won funding from the German-Polish Science Foundation (DPWS) for the project SAFE – Security Alliance for German-Polish Endeavors to prepare a cross-border criminological regional analysis between Germany and Poland.[3] The project's outcome is this document that outlines the framework for implementing such an analysis. "SAFE", thereby, wants to contribute to the German-Polish relations, strengthen existing cooperation and fostering future collaboration as well.

For that purpose, two expert workshops were organized that brought together important and decisive interest groups, actors and stakeholders from the German and Polish sides. On one hand, the workshops aimed at discussing and evaluating potentials and risks for implementing such an analysis. On the other hand, they elaborated on identifying potential pilots for implementation, identifying necessary stakeholders for implementation and identifying financial resources for funding the analysis.

To this end, the paper is structured as follows. After a short description of the work being done in "SAFE", seminal considerations with Criminological Regional Analysis are presented. Secondly, adjustments to the outlined structures and contents from the first chapter are being examined with the objective of shaping the analysis in a way that applies to a regional context with a joint border. Subsequently, opportunities for funding are presented. The document closes with some concluding remarks and an outlook for the potential continuation of this German-Polish cooperation.

Border crossing points in Poland and Germany.

Foto © Andrzej Rostek / Shutterstock

1 Hirtenlehner et al. (2015).
2 BKA (2020).
3 For more information on the project see: https://www.bigs-potsdam.org/en/research/current-projects/safe-security-alliance-for-german-polish-endeavors/

2 REVIEW OF THE PROJECT WORK IN "SAFE"

In 2023, BIGS and PPHS received the agreement from the DPWS that funding for the project "SAFE" will be possible. In September of that same year, the project work started. Between September and December 2023, preparatory meetings were held and the partners drafted and finalized the cooperation contract to formalize the cooperation in the project.

Moreover, a first stakeholder analysis was carried out to identify potential participants and speakers for the workshop. The consortium decided to schedule the workshops at the beginning of 2024 to reserve time for preparation, avoid scheduling the workshops before the winter break in both countries, and still be in the early onset of 2024 to ensure that the original timetable with the according tasks will be fulfilled. The first workshop in Potsdam was therefore scheduled on the 6th of February and the second workshop in Poznan on the 5th of March to avoid too large a time gap between the workshops so that participants, speakers and organizers can recall, take up on and continue previous discussions from the first workshops.

For that purpose, agendas for the workshops were set up and locations for the meeting as well as hotel rooms and train connections were booked between December 2023, and February 2024. Save-the-date invitations to the workshops ensured that invitees were informed properly. Follow-up reminders enabled the project partners to include as many essential participants as possible.

For both workshops the consortium was able to invite high ranking representatives from municipalities, the police and politics to guarantee a high level of expertise and practical experience and to ensure that different perspectives will be considered in the preparation of the concept of "SAFE".

During the workshops, participants from the consortium partners protocolled the main results from the presentations and discussions. These results were then structured, organized and matched according to the main topics covered in the agendas of the workshops. The outcome from this work is summarized in this document that was created between March and April 2024.

3 CRIMINOLOGICAL REGIONAL ANALYSIS

In recent years, several criminological regional analyses have been conducted. Along with crime statistics, the perception of people towards crime and the feeling of (in-)security also matters. The scope of criminological regional analyses is to measure crime and feelings towards crime and (in-)security, analyze the data, find relationships between the measured phenomena and draw conclusions from the analysis.

The measurement of the fear of crime is a complex process. The dimensions of fear of crime overtaken by Gerhold et al. (2020) can be explained as depicted in Table 1. Measurements on the personal level indicate that people assess their fear (affective) or the probability (cognitive) of becoming a victim of crime. An example of a standard measurement of the affective fear of crime is the question of how safe or unsafe people feel when they are alone at night.[4] This can be supplemented with questions regarding frequency of having these feelings or differentiating among several types of crime.[5] The cognitive dimension covers questions like how probable people believe it is that they become a victim of a crime.[6]

The same differentiation between cognitive and affective assessment can be applied to the societal level where an assessment of a general fear that threats emerge and of a general fear that damage will be done on a societal level is inquired. On the affective dimension, an example would be that respondents perceive that the situation of safety and security in the last years in their country is worsening.[7] The cognitive dimension would aim at examining social norms and what is acceptable and relevant under the restriction of limited cognitive resources.[8]

4 Lüdemann (2006).
5 Gray et al. (2010).
6 Lüdemann (2006).
7 Gerhold et al. (2020).
8 Ibid.

Table 1: Dimensions of subjective feelings towards security.[9] Own depiction.

	PERCEPTION OF THREAT (AFFECTIVE)	PERCEPTION OF RISK (COGNITIVE)
PERSONAL LEVEL	General concern of potentially becoming a victim of crime	Assessing the probability of potentially becoming a victim of crime
SOCIAL LEVEL	General concern that threats and damage will occur	Assessing the risk that threats and damage will occur

Based on a definition by Koch (1992), the BKA states three main pillars for a criminological regional analysis. First, information on the city and its geographical entities. Second, information and crime and feelings of (in-) security and third, information on crime control.[10] The analysis aims to examine the situation of security in smaller geographical entities. Studies, however, apply different research questions and methods within the realm of criminological regional analyses, thus a broad field of studies falls in this branch of research.[11] The results are then to be used for a regional prevention strategy.[12]

Several issues have been identified in the conducted analyses that are also of relevance to the SAFE project. This includes issues that, e.g in Germany, reported crime in a specific city does not mean that the victim also lives in that city, that there might be different reporting periods and that matching between subjectively experienced crime and statistically reported crime might be complicated.[13] These considerations will be tackled in a potential implementation for the analyses at the border region between Germany and Poland.

The literature shows that there are a few studies on that subject. Ceccato & Haining (2004) examined a specific case of cross-border crime in the border region between Sweden and Denmark and looked at the change of the occurrence of crime before and after the critical Örsesund bridge. The authors found a tendency towards more vehicle-related crimes after the bridge had been built, but not to the overall frequency of crime.[14]

The study by Häder et al. (2007) interviewed people in Germany with respect to their feeling of insecurity concerning the border. They conducted a telephone survey on 1,137 people in Germany. The German Federal Police was interested in the subjective feeling of (in-)security in the border region between Saxonia and Poland after the Schengen agreement came into force. In that regard, people were also surveyed about their fear of crime. Bivariate correlations show that people who show higher values on fear of crime rated the Federal Police more positively.

Pfeiffer & Stöller (2018) focused on the elderly's feelings of (in-)security in the district of Oberwart in Burgenland, Austria. The authors find that the fear of vehicle theft and burglary related to the proximity of the border correlates with feelings of (in-)security. Moreover, a perception of the missing presence of security forces seems to be correlated with these subjective feelings.[15]

The examples show that studies on the feelings of (in-) security and fear of crime exist but are not covering the topic of a joint criminological regional analysis extensively. The "SAFE" project builds upon this previous work and aims to elaborate on tackling the issue of complexities in respect to analyzing crime, fear of crime and victimization at the border region.

9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 BKA (2023)
11 Becker-Oehm (2010).
12 Kober & Kahl (2012)
13 For more details see BKA (2020).
14 Ceccato & Haining (2004).
15 Pfeiffer & Stöller (2018)

4 CRIMINOLOGICAL REGIONAL ANALYSIS AT THE BORDER REGION

The aim of this chapter is to integrate the previous summary from chapter 2 into the concept for implementation for a criminological regional analysis at the border region between Germany and Poland. The project "SAFE" implemented two workshops in Potsdam and Poznań. The results from the workshops are summarized in this chapter. In line with the workshop agenda, this section is divided into sub-chapters. The workshops discussed and evaluated lessons learned, best practices, benefits and issues with implementing criminological regional analysis. For all these aspects, both the German and the Polish side are being taken into consideration as well as the perspectives of administrations, police and scientific stakeholders.

4.1 Benefits from implementing a Criminological Regional Analysis

After introduction, the first workshop in Potsdam started out with presenting core points for goals and implementation for criminological regional analyses. The first main point to be covered is the motivation to begin the process of such an analysis.

From an administrative perspective, several benefits have been stated. The results from the analysis can be integrated into preventive work. Criminological regional analysis can differ according to the research question. This also includes a definition of the granularity of the study in terms of regional breakdown. In several cases, the city – where it was the object of interest – was divided into subareas. This, in turn, allowed the administration that is concerned with crime prevention to propose and prepare measures to be taken according to the outcome of the study. This included, e.g., visiting districts of the city that showed results that deserved closer attention.

Secondly, this process allowed preventive work to legitimize several (counter-)measures. The analysis, therefore, might be useful to legititimize resource allocation towards preventive work within the administration. This seems to be a critical point. Schreiber (2018) finds a decrease in the number of committees in Germany concerned with local crime prevention. Moreover, it appears that there has been a decrease in financial means for personnel during the last decade.[16] Finally, not only preventive work can benefit but also emergency services and the club environment.

Connected to this point is the fact that some municipalities do not have the resources in terms of scientific education to implement the analysis themselves. Nevertheless, there is a great need for evidence-based local crime prevention.[17] A result from the workshop "Cooperation" states that from a municipality perspective, it might be beneficial to cooperate with external partners to ensure evidence-based findings and prevention programs. This, in turn, can again legitimize funding for crime prevention.

Moreover, this kind of analysis usually contains a survey. This means, from an administrative perspective, that the analysis is a way of asking for citizen's needs and shows how to take these needs into consideration. The German phrase, called *Bürgernähe*[18], represents that municipalities show interest in their inhabitant's concerns.

Security-related research may also constitute an organisational and financial challenge from the perspective of Polish local government administration. In practice, the level of crime threats, analysed qualitatively and quantitatively, also measured by the number of events in relation to the number of inhabitants, is the domain of the Police. Local authorities obtain this data from the Police and include it in their periodic reports if they are interested in it. The local government, in accordance with Polish law, is responsible for public safety but has no direct influence on the Police. Indirectly, it participates in the appointment of the local Police Commander,

16 Schreiber (2019).
17 Marks (2020).
18 This phrasing is not restricted to municipalities alone. *Bürgernahe* crime prevention is also a crucial point in police crime prevention. See for example Feltes (2013).

may submit applications and instructions related to the safety of residents, appoints security and order committees and defines program activities to counteract crime. In terms of crisis management, local bodies are responsible for anti-crisis activities, coordinating the actions of services in the city, district or commune. Specific responsibility rests with the Voivode, who, with the help of the Regional Police Commander, takes care of the safety of residents, mainly in the field of preventive activities, i.e. uniformed police officers in public spaces. The Commander independently carries out operational, intelligence, administrative activities and other related to conducting misdemeanour proceedings or criminal investigative proceedings (independently or under the supervision of the Prosecutor's Office). In such a specific context, it is difficult to find space and resources in local authorities in Poland for a broader interest in crime analysis, which is confirmed by the lack of this topic, e.g. in city development strategies.

Our project intentions and systematic study of the Polish-German border in the aspect of threats important to residents may be particularly important. They should contribute to a better understanding of the two nations, build an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and trust (adding, among others, issues of the local security environment) and provide opportunities for similar perception threats by Polish and German LEAs. It also seems that professional analyses combined with the publication of research results (with appropriate recommendations over time) to ensure public access may be important for the communities' feeling of security, building trust with LEAs and may influence the investment readiness of entities looking for safe places for business development.

The implementation of the SAFE project and further plans in this regard may constitute an impulse to improve the areas of interest of local authorities in terms of security analyses (commissioned to professional researchers), cooperation with the Police and local leaders and communities, and implementation of social debates which, apart from presenting the state of threats and the activities of LEAs, also define implementation recommendations that will actually improve the safety of Germans and Poles in border regions.

4.2 Lessons Learned

From the administrative perspective, some lessons learned have been mentioned from experiences with previous criminological regional analyses. First, internal and external communication seems essential. Coordinating with contact persons within the administration and with external partners can positively affect the outcome.

Bearing this in mind, an early integration of essential stakeholders was mentioned as a critical point. An analysis of important stakeholders aimed to be included can therefore provide benefits. These stakeholders, for instance, might comprise entities or individuals within entities that are needed in the provision of data for the analysis, stakeholders that are needed for continuing and enhancing the process, stakeholders needed for enhancing exploitation of results and stakeholders that are needed to be informed, e.g. due to hierarchical work organization. These steps can facilitate data requests and data collection as well as decision processes, e.g. by informing critical data providers early in the process.

Moreover, an extensive stakeholder analysis and stakeholder integration can ensure better and transparent communication. Stakeholders to be included are the mayors of the municipalities, administrations, the police, NGOs and associations. Preparing a broad field of stakeholders opens up the opportunity to prepare the local preventive work and consider different interests.

The inclusion of several institutions, NGOs and administrations bears the challenge that these actors are also following different interests. An example concerns the structures of administrations within these entities. While the police in Poland is founded on a central organizational structure, municipalities in Poland act independently. For a joint analysis as foreseen by "SAFE", it appears necessary that these interests are exchanged and compromises are settled to define common goals regarding the implementation of this analysis

From the police perspective, it seems apparent that the interpretation of data they are reporting is being done with consideration. Data can be misinterpreted easily,

Görlitz, Germany, June 24, 2024, the Border between Germany and Poland. Border control by the Federal Police.

Foto © NGCHIYUI / Shutterstock

thus, an important point to consider from the police perspective is that police statistics and other data have its limitations. This is connected to the way it was collected, to the scope that is covered, to the definition and classification of data etc.

It should be added that from the consortium's point of view, the Police collects, processes and analyses information/data about threats and crime very extensively. For internal needs, the Police have a resource of crime analysts who professionally investigate crimes in every possible aspect, also using analytical competencies of EUROPOL and INTERPOL. In addition to listing the categories of crimes and the place where they were committed, the Police also present the numbers of arrested perpetrators, the results of criminal proceedings, etc. The material is usually very broad but not always useful at the local level. This may mean that research by other specialists, also in cooperation with the Police, e.g. the approach proposed by SAFE, may enrich the actual picture of threats and social perception of crime.

Despite the above, it is also necessary to point out an important police (government) initiative to collect information from residents about threats in order to take an appropriate response and present the state of threats as part of the publicly available application National Security Threat Map.[19]

In addition to the crime rate, the consortium also proposes social research on crime fears and expectations regarding the local security dimension. Despite good experience in Germany and Poland with this research approach, it has not been applied to the border region. Rarely and imprecisely (inadequately in the understanding of the local environment) social research carried out in relation to security encourages us to conduct precise, regionally targeted research initiatives. From the perspective of using the results from the analyses that have already been executed, it was mentioned that it is beneficial to collect the results from the implemented analyses to have a form of comparison. The usage and implementation of the results after the analyses seems crucial and the process for comparison and adjustment can be accompanied with scientific partners.

19 More at: https://mapy.geoportal.gov.pl/iMapLite/KMZBPublic.html

4.3 Best Practices

During the workshops, several practices have been outlined that worked in the past and are connected to a certain stage in the process of a criminological regional analysis or crime prevention in itself. For that purpose, it seems also plausible to differentiate between best practices in connection with the implementation of past analyses per se and best practices that concentrate on measures related to crime prevention. Again, these best practices are assigned either to the administrative or the police perspective.

During the workshop in Poznań, we hosted a representative of the Wielkopolska Threat Observatory[20], an interdisciplinary initiative connecting many stakeholders in regional security activities, particularly dedicated to young people. This Polish good practice could become the basis for considerations on a broader research approach, not limited by time because it is permanently inscribed in the landscape of fighting threats and preventing crime in the local dimension. The purpose of the Observatory is to exchange information, experience and coordinate the activities of many institutions that are not connected on a daily basis or subordinate to each other. The Observatory is an instrument that facilitates diagnosis and prediction of emerging threats. It is also an opportunity to perceive threats from different perspectives and develop comprehensive solutions for threat prevention

It is recommended that this platform of cooperation between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, the Court, the City, the University of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, social leaders, civil society organisations and many other entities be used to develop the project and undertake research initiatives addressed to the inhabitants of the border region. It seems that such a solution could work in the context of cross-border cooperation on the Polish-German border.

4.3.1 Process

In the beginning of the analysis, the first finding of the workshop is that it is advantageous to advertise the analysis within the administration but also with certain external stakeholders. The goal is to inform partners and collaborators early in the process. In the city of Potsdam, as a preparation for starting off the analysis, a presentation of the main tasks for the analysis were presented in the prevention group, not only the crime prevention group, within the city to inform the mayor, the director the police and various other stakeholders. This had the advantage of including further stakeholders compared to presenting merely in the crime prevention group.

With respect to preparing a criminological regional analysis, it has been beneficial to include several stakeholders in the definition of the region in which the analysis is to be executed. This was done in Potsdam where representatives of the city, police representatives and the research institute were participating. This process ensured that different views were captured in the geographical breakdown of the city that built the foundation for the survey in the analysis. Practical considerations, e.g. occurrence of crime, more rural or urban areas etc., were brought together with theoretical and implementation issues like being able to have a representative population in the survey.

For the survey itself, efforts in public relations were of great advantage. Previous participation rates in the surveys of 30% to well above 40% were accomplished because surveys were advertised within the municipality before they started and during the survey period. People may be more inclined to participate in the survey if it is offered by the municipality itself. Compared to an external partner advertising the survey, people are more likely to know their administration than an external institution and this familiarity may be one reason that participation rates rise.

4.3.2 Crime prevention

The workshops summarized some of the important points regarding crime prevention in Germany and Poland. It was not possible to present all programs and measures. But during the workshops, aspects were mentioned that can be seen as beneficial for a potential criminological regional analysis since it gives a rough overview of what has already been put into practice. For that reason, it is worth summarizing these practices to avoid duplication of recommendations from a potential and sought for analysis by the project partners.

20 More at: https://www.obserwatorium.wlkp.pl/

As has been mentioned, crime prevention contains a broad field of measures and programs. For instance, summer camps for children and the youth, sensitizing the elderly for crimes, informing the public about different crimes and prosecutors, e.g. offenders that specifically aim to commit thievery against the elderly.

More precisely, several tools and software are in place. Police representatives from Poland presented the country map of threats. This is an interactive tool that can be used by everyone via smartphones or laptops and shows reported instances. The police of the corresponding district are obliged to investigate the reported instance and verify or falsify it within a given timeframe. Although this procedure shows some deficits, e.g. that people repeatedly report the same instance, it offers a rough approximation of reports and a rough database. In Cottbus, Germany, there is an application called 'Maerker'. This application allows citizens, comparably to the case in Poland, to report instances of dirt, vandalism, barriers and the like. It turns out that measures like these can support work in crime prevention since incivilities – these are signs of decay that might represent signs of social order, like drunk people, graffiti, consumption of illegal drugs[21] – correlate with fear of crime.[22]

For the potential in implementing a regional criminological analysis, even unused potential of certain tools can be of help. Partially, tools are in place that can be applied to the cooperation between Germany and Poland with respect to a potential joint analysis. One example has been mentioned during the workshop, namely the Internal Market Information System (IMI) that allows public authorities to exchange information among each other who are involved in practical implementation of EU law.[23]

These tools are supplemented by existing centers for cooperation, also between Germany and Poland. An example is the Police Customs Cooperation Centers (PCCC) in internal border regions of the EU that enhance cross-border police cooperation. One of these centers is located in Świecko, Poland. At the police level, cooperation exists between Polish police and federal as well as state police and customs in Germany. It acts as the second largest such center in the EU regarding information exchange. Moreover, it coordinates joint missions and countermeasures for crime and misdemeanors and collects emergency calls.

In Poland, surveys examining feelings of (in-)security and fear of crime are conducted on a regular basis. From every voivodeship in Poland, 1.000 people are surveyed. This provides a data base that enables the study of the development of feelings of (in-)security and fear of crime over time. In these surveys, current trending topics are considered.

4.4 Risks

Implementing a criminological regional analysis bears risks that need to be considered. This sub-section is concerned with potential issues that need closer attention in preparation for a potential follow-up project to 'SAFE'. Since municipalities, the police and further stakeholders are involved in the process, the distinction between the administrative and the police perspective is made again.

As has been mentioned in previous sub-sections, implementing regional criminological analyses might be supplemented with policy recommendations. These recommendations, however, might bear potential for political conflict. Security and feelings of security are sensitive topics, and some results from the surveys might be information not desired to be published. For that reason, a risk for implementing such an analysis is carried by political circumstances like party constellations in the municipality, previous or upcoming elections, e.g. for mayors, recent instances that might be connected to results from the survey and might reinforce unwanted circumstances and so forth.

Connected to this are current topics that might atrophy the process of implementing or preparing an analysis on crime and fear of crime. Unforeseeable changes on a local, regional or even international level might affect

21 Hohage (2004).
22 Hale (1996).
23 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/about/index_en.htm

Patrols for security services, search.

Foto © jarizPJ / Shutterstock.com

the funding for crime prevention, and thereby for implementing an analysis, and available staff due to a changing political focus. Examples from the workshop were the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic.

A joint criminological regional analysis at the border region implies functioning communication between authorities in the participating countries. During the workshop, it became apparent that organizational structures may lead to issues. The federal system in Germany appeared to be an obstacle in past instances of cooperation between Germany and Poland. Thus, for cooperating partners, it is not obvious in every case who are the responsible contacts in Germany.

From the perspective of the police, one task to be tackled is finding the right and comparable data that serves best the purposes of a criminological regional analysis. In this respect, changes of law in Germany and Poland might pose a major risk. Changes in law might affect definitions and reporting of certain crimes. Consequently, crime statistics that cover multiple years lose explanatory power. An example might be that a certain crime, e.g. thievery, is defined differently in 2022 than in 2021. This affects the reported number of crimes when new instances are reported as thievery that were not reported as such before. However, these changes are not rare, and they imply a careful interpretation of data used in the analysis.

A second challenge to be tackled is the issue of different statistics on crime and on socioeconomic factors in Germany and Poland. Related to the point mentioned above, definitions and reporting standards might differ between the two countries. This makes comparability between statistics and data by Germany and Poland complicated and impedes the analysis. In terms of implementing a criminological regional analysis at the border region between Germany and Poland, it seems necessary to have comparable data. When survey results are collected from both sides, these can be contrasted with data collected from authorities, e.g. crime data, data on employment, data on security forces etc. These comparisons are not perfect in any case but the analysis should aim to achieve the best approximation possible. A final concern with regard to the used data is the interpretation of data as has been pointed out before. The same data might be assessed by different actors in different ways, especially if sources and methodologies are not clearly stated in the analysis, if they are not considered sufficiently by the involved actors and if these concerns are not communicated with the target audience in a transparent and understandable manner.

Another issue emerges when it comes to the definition of security and safety. The police might take a different definition of these phenomena as a basis compared to citizens. Potential risks might occur in cases where countermeasures are put into practice but are not perceived as such by affected individuals, enterprises or institutions. Preventive measures might therefore turn out to be ineffective in practice.

Lastly, some cultural aspects were mentioned that need attention in implementing a joint analysis. On both sides, stereotypes exist of the other country, respectively. These stereotypes can lead to biases in estimations, obstacles in communication and further issues within the cooperation as a whole.

It is crucial to pay attention to potential issues concerning communication in terms of language. Cultural differences were stated during the workshop that might lead to differences in language, e.g. the imbalance between the amount of German courses offered in Polish schools compared to less numerous Polish courses offered in German schools.

Finally, political decisions play a crucial role that might influence the extent, form and continuity of cooperation between Germany and Poland. Political parties and policies might affect attitudes and regulations that can impact cooperation.

4.5 Requirements

From the risks, potentials, best practices and lessons learned described in the preceding sections, requirements with respect to a joint criminological regional analysis can be inferred. The results for the requirements are depicted in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Requirements for a joint Criminological Regional Analysis.

REQUIREMENTS		
Resources	**Cooperation**	**Implementation**
Funding	Clear communication	Clear Communication
Time	Extensive stakeholder analysis and stakeholder involvement	Well defined and collected data foundation
Personnel	Defining concrete and joint objectives	Incentives
Expertise	Risk management	Well considered recommendations and implementation activities

The table shows three categories comprised of the results from the workshop. First and foremost, resources are needed for the analysis. This includes funding to ensure kick-off, continuity and completion of the analysis. Secondly, time is to be considered by all participating partners taking communication (meetings, presentations, agreements and so forth), data collection (crime statistic and socioeconomic factors), evaluation and interpretation (data analysis) and reporting into account.

For the tasks to be covered it needs to be ensured that the right and sufficient personnel by the partners involved is provided. The project also needs to ensure expertise in practical terms (municipalities, police, NGOs, clubs etc.) and expertise from research institutes.

For the cooperation itself, clear and transparent communication is essential and supplemented by an extensive stakeholder analysis and stakeholder involvement

with clear-cut definition of objectives and goals and appropriate risk management.

For the implementation of the analysis, again, clear communication is important. This concerns the communication of the results to affected and interested individuals, institutions and enterprises. To produce reliable results that can be published, a solid data foundation is needed based on empirical and theoretical results, data availability and careful selection with practitioners. For some parts of the analysis, incentives might seem beneficial. This concerns requests for – potentially – sensitive data, the involvement of further stakeholders and promoting the survey as an essential part of the analysis. Finally, policy recommendations need to be considered carefully and be put into practice – optimally – in close collaboration among the participating partners.

4.6 Parameters for implementing the analysis

In this subsection, concrete steps for implementing the criminological regional analysis at the border region between Germany and Poland are considered with adjustments to previous work processes of the contributing partners. As outlined in the proposal, the consortium aims at reaching stakeholders to participate in a potential analysis within a follow-up project.

Table 3: Stakeholder Management.

	Administrative Authority	Law Enforcement Agency	Research Institute	Non-governmental actors
Germany	Cottbus Frankfurt (Oder)	Brandenburg Police and Federal Police	BIGS	IABG
Poland	Słubice county Krosno Odrzańskie county	Regional Police Headquarter in Gorzów Wielkopolski	PPHS	Euroregions: Spree Neisse Bober and Pro Europa Viadrina

For the implementation of the analysis in the region, the municipalities of Cottbus in Germany and counties of Słubice and Krosno Odrzańskie in Poland were chosen.

For the study design and the survey sample, previous analyses conducted by the partners serve as the reference point. In Potsdam, the survey sample comprised 3,000 questionnaires that were sent out with a total population of 191,000. With a participation rate of 37 % a net sample of 1,111 respondents was achieved.[24] For a representative sample the consortium aims at 1,500 - 2,000 questionnaires to be sent out for Cottbus which has a total population of 99,500.

On the Polish side of the border area, the most appropriate area for conducting the survey is the county level, because the county includes cities as well as rural areas. Thanks to this, it is possible to cover areas with different settlement characteristics. Moreover, police statistics in Poland are kept at the county level, which will facilitate data comparison. Two counties would be best suited to participate in the study: Słubice, approximately 50,000 inhabitants, and Krosno Odrzańskie, approximately 52 thousand inhabitants. In each case, 1,000 surveys should be sent to residents.

For the creation of the questionnaire for the joint analysis, past questionnaires will serve as a reference point for the survey planned at the border region with adjustments inferred from the results of the workshop. The results are summarized in Table 4 below.

24 This participation rate is quite high compared to other surveys. The consortium aims at achieving this participation rate. As it has been mentioned before, this depends highly on the right survey design and accompanying public relations work by the municipality.

Table 4: Questionnaire with adjustments.

Previous Questionnaire	Adjustments adddressing the Border Region
Information on demographic factors	
Quality of life	Addressing the potential impact of cultural differences
Living situation	
Feeling of (in-)security and fear of crime	Addressing feeling of (in)security and fear of crime considering the border region and border-related crime. Addressing the potential impact of cultural differences
Victimization	Addressing victimization considering the border region and border-related crime
Disorder and incivilities	
Presence of security forces	
	Current and trending topics
	Topics on German-Polish Cooperation
	Recommendations for local self-governments and the role of civil society

Previous versions of the questionnaire are depicted on the left-hand side of the table. It comprises information on demographics (age, gender and so forth), information on the quality of life of respondents, their situation of living, i.e. housing costs, neighborhood etc., their feelings toward security, safety and crime, information of previous victimization, perceived social disorder, e.g. broken windows, and the presence of security forces. For the purpose of the project SAFE, the issues of feelings of (in-)security and fear of crime as well as for victimization need to be adjusted for border region. Thus, the questions will include more specific formulations that aim at receiving information from the respondents with regard to border-related crime and feelings of (in-) security. Moreover, in the further progress of the collaboration between BIGS and PPHS after "SAFE" questionnaires from the German and the Polish side will be collected and compared to account for integrating previously set out standards and successful surveys.

The workshop, furthermore, provided reasonable grounds to cover current topics in the questionnaire, as this has been implemented in the regularly conducted surveys in Poland with added value to the results of the survey. Finally, topics of German-Polish cooperation that consider the region of interest, i.e. the border region, will be included in the questionnaire. The questionnaire will be agreed upon and finalized in close coordination with involved stakeholders, mainly the police and the municipalities and the research institutes. In preparation, the questionnaires concerning a regional criminological analysis that were distributed previously in Poland and Germany by the research institutes or by participants during the workshop will be compared and synergies will be identified.

During the workshop it became apparent that crime statistics between Germany and Poland differ in many aspects. Nevertheless, options opened to focus on se-

lected types of crime for the criminological regional analysis. Participants from the police stated that there were first approaches between German and Polish representatives of police authorities to find matching and comparable data from both crime statistics. This concerned individual crimes but not the statistic as a whole. In turn, it might be beneficial to restrict the analysis to specific types of crime that are comparable between the Polish and German crime statistics and adjust the questionnaire accordingly.

Previous research on the subjective perception of security indicates that Poles rate the state of security in their direct neighborhood higher than the security in the country. According to the survey "Feeling Safety and Threats Crime" conducted in 2023 by Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (Public Opinion Research Center): 96% considered their direct neighborhood safe, and only 88% considered Poland a safe country. Hence, we should distinguish these two categories: local security and general security, as an important factor determining the subjective perception of threats.[25] In addition, questions on the sense of security related to the border location should be included. Does the proximity of the border result in additional security risks that would not occur if the border was far away?

The border context also requires taking into account potential types of crime related to the presence of the border, such as: smuggling, transport of illegal goods, movement of migrants, human trafficking, prostitution, economic crimes, illegal trade, organized criminal groups. These phenomena may have their source outside the border area. However, they focus their activities on border areas.

The questionnaire should include a question about the perception of new types of threats. Such as: cybersecurity, online fraud, disinformation, radicalization and aggression on the Internet. These phenomena are not essentially cross-border in nature, but they significantly affect the general sense of security of residents.

A very relevant factor would also be recommendations for improving safety in the place of residence addressed to local authorities and actors of social life other than the police, such as schools, media, civil society organizations, etc.

Furthermore, an important aspect is the residents' self-reflection on their own role in the process of preventing and counteracting security threats. Hence, an important dimension of the study is the assessment and recommendations of residents regarding the participation of civil society organizations or informal groups of residents, neighborhood communities or individual citizens in public safety. It is also particularly important to address the role of civil society organizations. In both project workshops, much attention was devoted to the role of the police and local governments on both sides of the border. However, more attention should also be paid to the issue of civil society involvement in security issues.

In summary and based on these considerations, the analysis of safety on the Polish-German border will include, in a survey addressed to residents of the border areas, questions regarding the following issues:

- personal perception of the state of security in the place of residence and the surrounding area,
- personal experiences related to threats to safety regarding being a victim or witness of crimes or offenses,
- personal perception of security threats related to the existence of a state border,
- awareness of threats related to cybersecurity, disinformation, fake news, radicalization,
- recommendations for actions of local authorities and civil society to improve the security situation in the area.

25 Public Opinion Research Center: Research announcement: Feeling Safety and threats crime. May 2023. More at: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_058_23.PDF

5 FINANCIAL OPTIONS FOR CRIMINOLOGICAL REGIONAL ANALYSIS

To implement the analysis, funding is needed. During the workshop, three different sources of funding were discussed. These three sources are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Sources of funding.

FUNDING SOURCES	POLAND	GERMANY	JOINTLY
INTERREG			X
DPWS/PNFN			X
NATIONAL MINISTRIES OF FINANCE (STATE LEVEL)	X	X	
SDPZ/FWPN			X

First of all, the Interreg program appeared as a potential funding source for the analysis. The Interreg-program for Brandenburg-Poland seems to be a potential source for funding a potential follow-up project.[26] This program comprises four priorities. Three of them (1, 2 and 4) are of interest for a strived-for follow-up project.

Secondly, the opportunity to apply for a renewed funding from the German-Polish Foundation for Science, which also funded "SAFE", is given. Other funding opportunities are available at the Ministries of Finance or Interiors in Germany and Poland, respectively.

Another option is to apply for a grant from the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation based in Warsaw. The Foundation awards small grants for joint projects, implemented in cooperation by entities from Poland and Germany. The Foundation's support covers a wide thematic spectrum, which also includes the analysis of security on the Polish-German border.[27]

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK

The SAFE project successfully achieved two main objectives: establishing the foundation for a joint criminological regional analysis and strengthening German-Polish cooperation. By organizing and conducting two workshops with selected experts, the consortium brought together relevant stakeholders from the police, administration, civil society, and academic institutions. They identified risks, potentials, requirements, and parameters for a possible follow-up project. The consortium also identified potential pilot regions, estimated the sample size, and identified possible funding sources. The SAFE project successfully created a framework for further collaboration and the potential future implementation of a criminological regional analysis in the German-Polish border region. This analysis aims to enhance security in the border areas of Poland and Germany, strengthen the sense of safety among residents and investors, and provide professional information about the security environment to the public administrations of both countries.

26 For more information see: https://interreg-brandenburg-polska.eu/
27 More at: https://fwpn.org.pl/wnioski/co-wspieramy-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Becker-Oehm, Sybille. 2010. Die Kriminologische Regionalanalyse: Notwendige Ausgangsbasis für die Kommunale Kriminalprävention? Bochum: Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer.

BKA. 2020. „Der Deutsche Viktimisierungssurvey 2017." Wiesbaden.

BKA. 2023. „Lokale Sicherheitsanalysen in Deutschland – Untersuchungsjahr 2022." KKF-Aktuell.

Ceccato, Vania, and Robert Haining. 2004. „Crime in Border Regions: The Scandinavian Case of Öresund, 1998-2001." Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 94. pp.: 807–826.

Feltes, Thomas. 2013. „Bürgernahe Polizeiarbeit in Deutschland." OSZE-Jahrbuch, pp.: 241-252.

Gerhold, Lars, Roman Peperhove, and Helga Jäckel. 2020. „Sicherheitsempfinden, Sicherheitskommunikation und Sicherheitsmaßnahmen." Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit.

Gray, Emily, Jonathan Jachson, and Stephen Farrall. 2010. „Feelings and Functions in the Fear of Crime." The British Jounala of Criminology, vol. 51, pp.: 75–94.

Häder, Michael, Mike Kühne, and Ute John. 2007. „Das Image der Bundespolizei in Ostsachsen: Forschung zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis." Sozialwissenschaften und Berufspraxis, vol. 39, pp.: 242-260.

Hale, C. 1996. „Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature." International Review of Victimology, vol. 4, doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/026975809600400201.

Hirtenlehner, Helmut, and Dina Hummelsheim. 2015. Kriminalitätsfurcht und Sicherheitsempfinden: Die Angst der Bürger vor dem Verbrechen (und dem, was sie dafür halten). Vol. 47.1, in Viktimisierungsbefragungen in Deutschland, Nathalie Guzy and Christoph Birkel, editor: Robert Mischkowitz. Wiesbaden.

Hohage, Christoph. 2004. „Incivilities und Kriminalitätsfurcht." Soziale Probleme, vol. 15, pp.: 77-95.

Kober, Markus, and Wolfgang Kahl. 2012. Impulse für das Kommunale Präventionsmanagement. Stiftung Deutsches Forum für Kriminalprävention (DFK). Bonn.

Lüdemann, Christian. 2006. „Kriminalitätsfurcht im urbanen Raum." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, pp.: 285–306.

Marks, Erich. 2020. „Die Entwicklung der kommunalen Kriminalprävention in Deutschland – aus der Praxis." Tübinger Schriften und Materialien zur Kriminologie, pp.: 15-28.

Pfeiffer, Christian, and Julia Söller. 2018. „Dimensionen des subjektiven Sicherheitsempfindens Älterer in einer Grenzregion des Burgenlandes." Tagungsband des 12. Forschungsforum der österreichischen Fachhochschulen (FFH) 2018.

Schreiber, Verena. 2019. „Kommunale Kriminalprävention in Deutschland 2018." Forschungsberichte des Nationalen Zentrums für Kriminalprävention. Vol. 1., Nationales Zentrum Kriminalprävention. Bonn.

IMPRINT

Located in Potsdam, the Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization with an inter- and multidisciplinary approach with a mission to close the gap between academia and practice in civil security. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security (BIGS).

Project acronym:
SAFE

Project full title:
Security Alliance for German-Polish Endeavors

Call identifier:
Main Call

Start date:
01/09/2023

End date:
30/09/2024

Grant agreement no:
100-2023-00054

Polish Platform For Homeland Security

Gefördert von

DEUTSCH POLNISCHE WISSENSCHAFTS STIFTUNG | POLSKO NIEMIECKA FUNDACJA NA RZECZ NAUKI

SAFE
Security Alliance for German-Polish Endeavors

Authors:
Rafał Batkowski, Kai Beerlink, Paul Glöckner, Bartłomiej Ostrowski, Tim Stuchtey

Editor:
Brandenburgisches Institut für Gesellschaft und Sicherheit gGmbH
(Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security)

Dr. Tim H. Stuchtey
(responsible according to the German press law)

BIGS ESSENZ No. 22, September 2024

ISSN 2191-6756

BIGS
BRANDENBURGISCHES INSTITUT für GESELLSCHAFT und SICHERHEIT

Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security
Executive Director: Dr. Tim H. Stuchtey

Dianastraße 46 . 14482 Potsdam
Tel.: +49-331-704406-0 . Fax: +49-331-704406-19
E-Mail: info@bigs-potsdam.org . www.bigs-potsdam.org

WWW.BIGS-POTSDAM.ORG

BIGS

BRANDENBURGISCHES INSTITUT
für GESELLSCHAFT und SICHERHEIT